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Research Associates William J. Baumol and Edward N. Wolff find that
technological change has serious side effects in the labor market. As the
pace of technological change increases, firms need to close to re t o o l
their factories more often and so have to lay off employees more often;
f i rms also need to retrain workers or hire new workers with diff e re n t
skills. This means an increase in the number of workers who are between
jobs, longer periods of unemployment between jobs, and perhaps perma-
nent unemployment for those who are most costly to retrain, such as
older and less-educated workers. With technology that is constantly
changing and changing at an accelerating pace, there is not only a tem-
porary increase in the level and duration of joblessness, but a long-term
p e rmanent increase in the rate of unemployment throughout the busi-
ness cycle.
In this brief Baumol and Wolff focus more on the duration of joblessness
than its level. They review data showing a worldwide trend toward
longer duration. In the United States between 1948 and 1993 the aver-
age length of time a worker was between jobs doubled and the portion of
the unemployed defined as long-term unemployed quadrupled. The
increases were even larger in Europe.
The authors report on their investigation to sort out the effects of tech-
nological, institutional, and demographic variables on unemployment
duration. Their statistical analysis, which shows that an increase in the
rate of total factor productivity growth and an increase in investment in
office, computer, and accounting equipment are closely associated with
an increase in average duration of unemployment, provides strong sup-
port for their thesis that the duration of joblessness rises when the rate of
technological change rises.
Baumol and Wo l ff review briefly some of the many serious social and
psychological consequences of joblessness, the costs of which must be
added to economic factors in order to calculate the total cost of unem-
ployment. The authors point out that it is reasonable to assume that
these consequences (such as suicide, illness, divorce, and criminal activ-
ity) intensify the longer a worker is unemployed.
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could offset some of the side effects of technological change. First,
increase the period of eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits to
39 weeks or a year. Despite the fact that the average duration of unem-
ployment has more than doubled since the late 1940s, unemployment
insurance benefits still expire after 26 weeks. Also, increase the income
replacement rate of unemployment insurance. The increase in the dura-
tion and level of benefits can give unemployed workers adversely
affected by technological innovation added time for retraining. Second,
t a rget job retraining programs at emerging technologies so that unem-
ployed workers can acquire the requisite skills to meet the needs of
employers and find suitable employment. Third, conduct re s e a rch into
the best way to improve the educational achievement of those most at
risk for protracted or permanent joblessness—older workers and young,
less-educated workers.
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5.4 percent and unemployment was down to 4.3 percent, the lowest in
almost 30 years. But, what are some of the realities behind this news? A
4.3 percent unemployment rate translates into 5.9 million unemployed
people. The average unemployment rate, adjusted for business cycle
fluctuations, has slowly but steadily increased since the Second Wo r l d
War. Today’s 4.3 percent unemployment rate is twice as high as it was in
a peak year in the 1950s. Along with the increase in the level of unem-
ployment there has been a persistent increase in the length of time a
typical unemployed person is between jobs, an increase in the portion of
total unemployed who are classified as long-term unemployed, and a
d e c rease in the portion of unemployed persons who are covered by
unemployment insurance.
Why does a dynamic, growing economy have a persistent long-term
unemployment problem even in the best of economic times? Research
Associates William J. Baumol and Edward N. Wo l ff have isolated one
cause. Technological change, the engine of growth and economic
progress, has the serious side effects of increasing the level and duration
of unemployment. Technological change is constantly creating demand
for new skills and making other skills obsolete. Many economists and
policymakers have assumed that as long as technology creates as many
jobs as it destroys, it will not increase the unemployment rate. But,
according to Baumol and Wolff, that may be a hasty conclusion. 
Although technology may not affect or may even increase the total
number of jobs available, the fact that it changes the skills needed can
increase the level and duration of unemployment. When a firm changes
7 The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College
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technology, it may temporarily lay off workers while it closes to retool its
facilities and it may permanently lay off workers with some skills and
hire new workers with different skills. Some workers, particularly those
who have the hardest time acquiring new skills, may be unable to take
advantage of the new job opportunities and may face long-term unem-
ployment. Changes like these can affect workers at all stages of the busi-
ness cycle.
What can we do about it? The answer is not to decrease the pace of
technological change. Technological change is by far the most important
s o u rce of economic growth. Baumol and Wo l ff suggest ways to offset 
and reduce the costs of the increased duration of unemployment.
Unemployment insurance benefits can be extended and increased to
adjust to the reality that workers now tend to be between jobs more
often and for longer periods. Government retraining programs can be
specifically targeted at emerging skills. Research can be undertaken to
find ways to improve the success of programs aimed at retraining the
workers most at risk for protracted joblessness, the poorly educated
young workers and older workers.
Baumol and Wolff’s research should remind us that economic gains do
not come without social costs. It would be unwise to hold back technol-
ogy because of its side effects, but it would be equally unwise to do noth-
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[In] Rotterdam . . . of the 50,000 jobless, 32,000 have been unem-
ployed for more than a year, and many for more than three years.
. . . More than 40% of the 17m[illion] unemployed in the
E u ropean Union have been out of work for at least a year; a third
have never worked at all. In the United States . . . only 11% of
the unemployed have been looking for work for more than a year.
(The Economist, July 30–August 5, 1994, 19–20)
An increase in the pace of technological change can have two profound
side effects in the labor market. It can increase the rate and the average
duration of unemployment. Because firms may not consider it cost-
e ffective to retrain some types of workers to keep up with change,
notably the less-educated and older employees, these workers may be
jobless for long periods of time, with some of them perhaps never work-
ing again. If technological change causes workers to become unemployed
m o re often and for longer periods of time, not only will the level of
unemployment increase, but the “natural rate of unemployment,” the
hypothesized minimum sustainable rate of unemployment, will increase
as well. Thus, the problem discussed here can cause sustained increase in
the equilibrium rate of unemployment, which is more serious than a sim-
ple increase in the unemployment rate, which may be temporary.
In saying that the level and duration of unemployment may be incre a s e d
by accelerating technological change, we are emphatically not assert i n g
that this is the only factor in such developments. Clearly, the character,
magnitude, and duration of joblessness are affected by many factors—the
s t ru c t u re of the unemployment insurance system, other elements of pub-
lic policy, union power and behavior, international trade developments,
How Technological Change
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and a profusion of others. Even the role of innovation is more complex
than a simple statement of our central argument suggests. For example,
the severity of the consequences of innovations for employment tends to
depend on the level of new skills and education the innovations re q u i re ,
and thus the average length of unemployment may well increase even
when the pace of innovation remains the same. However, the evidence
s u p p o rts the conclusion that an increase in the pace of innovation (all
else equal) will raise both the natural rate of unemployment and the aver-
age length of time during which an unemployed worker is “between jobs.”
Our focus in this brief is less on the level of unemployment and more on
its duration. We demonstrate how the cost of retraining can lead to
longer average duration of unemployment when the pace of technologi-
cal change increases and review the data for the United States and other
industrial countries showing that there is a trend toward an increase in
the length of joblessness. We also present the findings of our statistical
analysis of the influence of technological change upon the duration. We
review briefly some of the social consequences of unemployment. Finally
we consider the policy implications of our findings. It almost goes without
saying that society will not chose to slow down technical pro g re s s .
H o w e v e r, a combination of greater retraining eff o rts and extended unem-
ployment insurance benefits can offset many of the problems caused by
rising unemployment duration. This may give unemployed persons both
the means and the opportunity to acquire the requisite skills.
The Natural Rate of Unemployment and the Pace of
Technological Change
C o n s i d e r, first, the effect of an increase in the pace of technological
change on the level of unemployment in the economy, leaving to the
next section its effect on the length of time an average unemployed
worker will be between jobs. The “natural rate of unemployment” pre-
sumably encompasses both “frictional” and “structural” unemployment.
Frictional unemployment is the period of joblessness before workers can
find new positions after leaving or being laid off from a job. Structural
unemployment is joblessness caused by the obsolescence of workers’
skills. Both of these types of unemployment will be affected by the fre-
quency with which plants close down either permanently or for a period
PPB No.41  2/18/99  2:43 PM  Page 10of reconstruction or retooling. An increase in the rate of technological
change will increase the frequency with which plants close and thus will
increase the portion of the labor force that is unemployed in any period.
The continuous character of technological innovation is a central part of
this scenario; since at least the middle of the nineteenth century both
p roduction techniques and products have been constantly underg o i n g
modification and replacement.
An example can help describe the logic of the effects on level of unem-
ployment. Assume that, initially, the rate of technological innovation is
such that an average plant can be expected to need to close for redesign
and retooling once every 50 years and that it will need to be closed for 1
year. If an employee of the plant is laid off during this period and is then
re h i red or, on average, takes 1 year to find a new job, technological
change will have contributed 2 percent to the unemployment rate; that
is, the employee will have been unemployed for 1 year in 50 (or 2 years
in 100) because of the change. Now, consider a speed up in the rate of
change so that the plant must be modernized every 25 years instead of
every 50. If everything else remains as before, the contribution of tech-
nological change to unemployment will double to 4 percent. These
numbers may not correspond even approximately to reality, but the con-
clusion is valid in general.
If we compare two otherwise identical economies, we can expect more
openings and closings of business units in the more innovative economy
than in the relatively stationary economy. The opening of new business
units in an economy with rapid change keeps the jobs lost from plant
closings from becoming more than temporary. Nevertheless, it re m a i n s
t rue that frictional and structural unemployment will be perm a n e n t l y
and, plausibly, substantially higher in an economy with rapid change than
in an economy with slow change because the greater continuous flow of
change means that job losses will occur more fre q u e n t l y. No sooner will
one set of technologically unemployed find new jobs than they will be
replaced by a new group of jobless, thrown out of work by a succeeding set
of plant closings. The constant creation and loss of jobs resulting fro m
technological change do not simply balance out, even if the two occur at
identical rates. The process stirs up job change and that takes time, con-
tributing a net increase in the natural rate of unemployment and one that
is not transitory as long as the pace of change continues. 
How Technological Change Increases the Duration of Unemployment
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We turn now to a discussion of the relationship between the rate of
technological change and the length of joblessness. The distinction
between the level of unemployment and its duration is of considerable
i m p o rtance for the social consequences of unemployment. Even if the
unemployment rate does not change, the duration of joblessness can
vary substantially. The unemployment rate will be the same when 4 mil-
lion workers are unemployed for three months on average during a year
and when 1 million workers are unemployed for a full year. Yet the con-
sequences of the extended period of joblessness for the mental state and
behavior of the people without jobs and for the functioning of society
can be significant.
Duration of Joblessness and the Pace of 
Technological Change
An increase in the rate of technological change has three pert i n e n t
effects. First, as has been indicated, it increases the natural rate of unem-
ployment. Second, it increases the relative cost of employing a person
who is relatively expensive to retrain or who is less likely to increase rev-
enue enough to make up for the cost of retraining. Third, because of the
increased retraining costs for these workers, they may remain jobless for
longer than workers more likely to be retrained by employers. Thus, the
increase in the rate of change raises the share of jobless persons whose
duration of unemployment is relatively long.
Firms believe it is not cost-effective to retrain older or less-skilled work-
ers, either because the retraining costs are higher or because the workers
will not be on the job long enough or will not be productive enough for
firms to recoup the costs of retraining. Firms, therefore, prefer to replace
these workers with younger, more-educated workers, who may be higher
paid but whose retraining cost is not as high. This preference (combined
with the reduction in overall level of employment) not only leads to an
increase in the share of the unemployed labor force made up of workers
with high retraining costs, but it also threatens them with perm a n e n t
unemployment or at least a long period of job search before they are able
to find a new job. Of those who suffer long-term unemployment, two
g roups are most affected. A dispro p o rtionate share is made up of older
workers whose place of employment moved or closed down or simply
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u n d e rwent substantial job trimming and younger people in depre s s e d
urban and rural areas, particularly members of minority groups with
characteristically low incomes, many of whom have had inferior educa-
tion and have never held anything but dead-end jobs or jobs in the
underground economy.
The most important relationships in this analysis can be explained with a
simplified example. Suppose the wage of an unskilled worker is $9,000 per
year and the cost of retraining is $4,000, while a skilled worker costs
$30,000 in wages and $6,000 in retraining. If retraining is re q u i red every
two years, the average yearly cost to the employer of an unskilled worker is
$11,000, that is, $9,000 in wages plus $2,000 in retraining (half of the
$4,000 re q u i red every two years). The cost of a skilled worker is $33,000
($30,000 in wages plus $3,000 in retraining costs). This means that a
skilled worker costs the employer three times as much as the unskilled
employee, which implies the employer believes a skilled worker is thre e
times as productive as an unskilled worker.1 Now suppose there is an accel-
eration of innovation so that retraining is re q u i red once a year. Assuming
no change in wages, the annual cost of the unskilled worker rises to
$13,000 ($9,000 + $4,000) and the annual cost of the skilled worker rises
to $36,000 ($30,000 + $6,000). Now the cost of a skilled worker is less
than three times the cost of an unskilled worker, meaning that unskilled
employees are relatively more expensive than they used to be. If this is so,
f i rms will try to hire more skilled and less unskilled workers.2 If many
employers are facing a similar situation, unskilled workers will be more
likely to lose their job and will find it more difficult to find another job.
In other words, as the frequency with which workers need re t r a i n i n g
increases, a higher percentage of those who are fired will be unskilled,
and it will take those workers longer than before to find reemployment.
This is clearly a way in which increased rapidity of technical change can
add to the average duration of unemployment, even without taking into
account the frequency with which such change increases the need for
superior worker skill and education, thereby reducing still further the rel-
ative value of an unskilled worker.
The same basic story is repeated for older workers. They may be harder
to retrain than young, educated workers because they may have become
set in their ways and because their education predates the latest
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t e c h n ical developments. In addition, being closer to re t i rement age,
older workers offer the employer a briefer stream of revenues and dimmer
prospects of recouping the retraining costs (cf. Becker 1975).
There is the likelihood that some of these workers who become unem-
ployed may remain permanently jobless or find new employment only
after a considerable lag. They will face a time between jobs well above
their previous average and probably higher than the former average for
the labor force as a whole. With the unskilled and older workers consti-
tuting a greater pro p o rtion of the unemployed and with their time
between jobs increased, the average duration of unemployment for the
economy must rise.
The unskilled and older workers whose jobs are threatened may be will-
ing to accept low wages as an alternative to unemployment. However, if
wages are sticky because of customs, institutions such as the minimum
wage, the possibility that only a wage below the subsistence level will be
low enough to open up job opportunities, or any other reason, then
unemployment may be the only possible outcome for these individuals,
and there is no reason for this period of unemployment to be brief or
even temporary. Indeed, it is possible that the cost of training will be so
high for some unskilled or older workers that it will not pay to hire them
even at a zero wage, causing lifetime unemployment or employment in
the underground economy.3
We again would like to emphasize that the mechanism we have outlined
is not the only influence that can lead to lengthening of the period of
joblessness. Our story provides conditions sufficient but hardly necessary
to yield that result. For example, as already remarked, increased com-
plexity of new products and processes can be at least as disadvantageous
to unskilled or older workers as sheer acceleration of technological
change in general. This is important to keep in mind in evaluating the
mechanism in light of recent empirical evidence. Recent developments
may justifiably raise the question of how one can reconcile this mecha-
nism for the growth in the duration of employment with the fact that in
much of the industrial world the growth of total factor productivity has
declined materially since the decades immediately following the Second
World War, apparently implying that technological change has slowed.4
It will emerge from our statistical analysis that the major reason for the
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g rowth in the duration of unemployment is the incredible growth in
computerization over the last quarter century.
Trends in the Duration of Unemployment
The duration of unemployment has risen rather dramatically over the
last half century. The mean duration of unemployment appro x i m a t e l y
doubled between the early 1950s and the mid 1990s, with most of the
i n c rease occurring since the early 1970s. Between the 1970s and the
early 1990s the rise in unemployment duration was almost universal
among demographic groups, with the average weeks of unemployment
i n c reasing generally about 3 to 4 weeks (Table 1). Average weeks of
unemployment rose more among older workers, so that the spread in
unemployment duration between older (ages 55–64) and younger
(teenage) male workers widened sharply, with the difference increasing
from 10.8 to 17.1 weeks.
F i g u re 1 summarizes pertinent data provided by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (see Baumol and Wo l ff 1998, for details on data sources and
Figure 1  Trends in Duration of Unemployment, United States,
1 9 4 8 – 1 9 9 3
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977–1994); Handbook of Labor Statistics
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985), Bulletin 2217, Table 15.
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All men 13.1 17.1 17.2
16–19 years 8.3 9.3 8.5
20–24 years 11.6 14.5 12.6
25–34 years 14.0 18.3 17.0
35–44 years 16.8 21.1 20.3
45–54 years 18.0 22.7 24.1
55–64 years 19.1 23.8 25.6
65 years and over 21.0 19.3 24.5
Women
All women 10.5 12.4 13.3
16–19 years 7.5 7.8 7.5
20–24 years 9.5 10.8 9.5
25–34 years 10.8 12.9 13.2
35–44 years 12.1 14.7 16.0
45–54 years 13.9 16.1 18.1
55–64 years 16.5 17.8 20.1
65 years and over 18.2 15.6 19.6
White, 16 years and over 11.7 14.4 15.2
Men 12.8 16.6 16.9
Women 10.2 11.6 12.9
Black, 16 years and over 12.8 17.0 16.6
Men 14.2 19.3 18.6
Women 11.4 14.6 14.4
Men, 16 years and over
Married, spouse present 14.8 19.4 19.6
Widowed, divorced, 
or separated 14.4 20.9 20.3
Single (never married) 11.2 14.3 14.3
Women, 16 years and over
Married, spouse present 10.6 12.2 14.0
Widowed, divorced, 
or separated 10.9 15.4 15.7
Single (never married) 9.4 10.9 11.2
S o u rc e : U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earn i n g s ( Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1977–1994); Handbook of Labor Statistics (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1985), Bulletin 2217, Table 15.
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t h rough 1993 the average duration of unemployment more than doubled
and the share of the unemployed composed of persons unemployed 27 weeks
or more (the longest period covered in the available data) about quadru p l e d .
Both trajectories are characterized by extreme fluctuations, but, based on a
c o n s e rvative calculation, the duration of unemployment grew at a rate of
nearly 1 percent per year and the share of the unemployed who were jobless
27 weeks or more grew at an average rate of 1.7 percent a year. In nearly half
a century these changes added substantially to the average duration of
unemployment and the pro p o rtion of those who suffer unemployment that
is clearly protracted. By 1993 the average duration had grown from about 8
to about 17 weeks and the share of long-term unemployed had grown from 5
p e rcent to over 20 percent of the total unemployed.
Protracted joblessness is an international phenomenon. Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) data show that, of 10
industrialized countries, the United States had the lowest incidence of
long-term unemployment (defined as joblessness for 52 weeks or more),
at 12 percent (Figure 2). Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands had the
unenviable position of being at the top, with more than half of their job-
Figure 2  Long-Term Unemployment as a Share of Total Unemployment, 10
OECD Countries, 1994
*1993 data.
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook, July 1995, 219.
How Technological Change Increases the Duration of Unemployment
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unemployment rates significantly higher than the United States.
Figure 3 compares the percentage growth in long-term unemployment as
a share of total unemployment for the same 10 countries from the mid
1970s to the mid 1990s. Once again, the United States, with its 130 per-
cent increase, is near the bottom of the group. It is outstripped by
Germany at the top, with its 320 percent rise, and by Canada, France,
the United Kingdom, and Sweden, with approximately 257, 245, 210,
and 144 percent, re s p e c t i v e l y. Clearly, this is no minor phenomenon,
and the United States is not its most badly damaged victim.
E ffects of Technological Variables on 
Unemployment Duration
We carried out a statistical analysis to sort out the effects of technologi-
cal, institutional, and demographic variables on changes in unemploy-
ment duration.5 The analysis is based on aggregate time-series data for the
Figure 3  G rowth in Long-Te rm Unemployment as a Share of Total Unemployment,
10 OECD Countries, 1970s versus 1990s
*1993 data.
†1979 data.
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook, July 1995, 219.
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United States, covering the period 1950 to 1995. Since the pace of tech-
nological change is itself almost impossible to observe dire c t l y, we used
five alternative indexes to measure technological activity: the standard
rate of total factor productivity (TFP) growth, the ratio of re s e a rch and
development (R&D) expenditures to gross domestic product (GDP), the
number of full-time equivalent scientists and engineers engaged in R&D
per 1,000 employees, investment in new equipment and machinery per
full-time equivalent employee (FTEE), and investment in office, comput-
ing, and accounting equipment (OCA) per FTEE. 
The institutional factors included the presence of unions, the minimum
wage, and three aspects of unemployment insurance: the percentage of
all employees covered by unemployment insurance; the re p l a c e m e n t
rate, or the ratio between unemployment benefits and the average previ-
ous wage; and the percentage of unemployed workers receiving benefits
(no benefits may be due to failure to meet eligibility re q u i re m e n t s ,
exhaustion of benefits, or not being covered by unemployment insur-
ance). The demographic factors included the gender, age, and racial
composition of the labor force.
The results provide strong support for the central thesis of our paper, that
the duration of unemployment increases when the rate of technological
change rises. The mean duration of unemployment remained larg e l y
unchanged over the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, at about 11.5 weeks; it
then jumped to 14.6 weeks in the 1980s and to 15.6 weeks in the first
half of the 1990s. All five technology indicators turn out to be positively
c o rrelated with unemployment duration (see Table 2). A 1 perc e n t a g e
point increase in the annual rate of TFP growth is associated with a 12
p e rcent increase in the mean duration of unemployment. This result is
p a rticularly striking given that the simple correlation between TFP
g rowth and unemployment duration is small and that the two move
cyclically in opposite directions. Computerization is the most significant
factor and has the strongest effect. An increase of $1,000 (in 1987 dol-
lars) of OCA investment per employee is associated with a 53 perc e n t
i n c rease in the mean duration of unemployment. The other technology
variables—R&D intensity and number of scientists and engineers
engaged in R&D—were positively correlated, although they were not
statistically significant.
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Table 2   Mean Duration of Unemployment and Mean Values of Technological
Variables by Period
C o rrelation 
with Mean 
1 9 5 0 – 1 9 6 0 – 1 9 7 0 – 1 9 8 0 – 1 9 9 0 – U n e m p l o y m e n t
1 9 5 9 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 5 D u r a t i o na
Mean duration of 1 1 . 4 1 1 . 7 1 1 . 5 1 4 . 6 1 5 . 6
unemployment 
( w e e k s )
Ratio of R&D 1 . 5 0 1 . 9 7 1 . 5 6 1 . 8 3 1 . 8 9 0 . 3 0
e x p e n d i t u res to 
GDP (%)
Number of scientists 4 . 0 1 4 . 8 1 4 . 3 2 5 . 4 7 6 . 3 0 0 . 4 0
and engineers engaged
in R&D per 1,000 
F T E E
OCA investment per  0 . 0 0 6 0 . 0 0 7 0 . 0 2 1 0 . 1 8 5 0 . 5 2 2 0 . 5 4
F T E E(thousands 
of 1987 dollars)
Equipment investment 1 . 9 6 2 . 5 4 3 . 4 6 3 . 8 0 4 . 3 5 0 . 4 9
per FTEE( t h o u s a n d s
of 1987 dollars)
Annual rate of TFP 1 . 5 6 1 . 7 5 0 . 6 5 0 . 4 7 0 . 2 9 0 . 2 3
g rowth (%)b
Note: For details on data sources and methods, see William J. Baumol and Edward N. Wolff, “Speed of
Technical Progress and Length of Average Interjob Period,” Working Paper no. 237, The Jerome Levy
Economics Institute, 1998.
a The correlation coefficient is computed on the basis of 36 observations (annual data 1950–1995),
except for the ratio of R&D expenditures to GDP (1953–1994) and scientists and engineers engaged
in R&D (1957–1994).
b Uses FTEE and gross nonresidential capital stock, the private sector only.
Source: Authors’ calculations from:
Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the Pre s i d e n t ( Washington, D.C.: Govern m e n t
Printing Office, various years).
John C. Musgrave, “Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth in the United States: Revised Estimates,”
Survey of Current Business 71, no. 1 (January 1992).
———, “Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth in the United States,” Survey of Current Business 74,
no. 8 (August 1994).
National Science Foundation, Research and Development in Industry (Arlington, Va.: National Science
Foundation, various years).
Survey of Current Business 71, no. 1 (January 1992); 76, no. 1-2 (January-February 1995).
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts of the United States, 2
( Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1959–1988); National Income and Prod u c t
diskettes. 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Detailed Investment by Industry (January) diskette, received 1996.
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The results for the other variables in the study re i n f o rce the significance of
the technology variables (see Tables 3 and 4). The percentage of all
employees covered by the unemployment insurance system, the ratio of
average unemployment insurance benefits to the average previous wage, 
Table 3   Mean Duration of Unemployment and Mean Values of Institutional
Variables by Period
C o rrelation 
with Mean 
1 9 5 0 – 1 9 6 0 – 1 9 7 0 – 1 9 8 0 – 1 9 9 0 – Duration of 
1 9 5 9 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 5 U n e m p l o y m e n ta
Mean duration 11.4 11.7 11.5 14.6 15.6
of unemployment
(weeks)
Employees 64.9 73.2 82.6 92.6 93.9 0.49
covered by UI (%)
UI replacement 33.4 34.9 36.5 36.2 36.7 0.35
rate (%)b
UI insured 53.3 47.1 47.8 36.8 35.2 0.39
coverage rate (%)c
Union members as 24.4 22.6 21.1 18.0 16.0 –0.56
percent of labor force
Minimum wage  3.59 4.46 4.52 3.73 3.33 –0.34
(in 1987 dollars)
N o t e : For details on data sources and methods, see William J. Baumol and Edward N. Wo l ff ,
“Speed of Technical Progress and Length of Average Interjob Period,” Working Paper no. 237,
The Jerome Levy Economics Institute,  1998.
a The correlation coefficient is computed on the basis of 36 observations (annual data
1950–1995), except for UI insured coverage rate (1967–1993).
bRatio of mean UI weekly benefit to mean weekly wage.
cRatio of insured unemployment to total unemployment.
Source: Authors’ calculations from:
Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, 1994 Green Book (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office).
Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, various years).
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1997, 117th edition
(Washington, D.C.).
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earn i n g s ( Washington, D.C.: Govern m e n t
Printing Office, 1977–1994).
———, Handbook of Labor Statistics ( Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985),
Bulletin 2217, Table 15.
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tive, but not statistically significant, relationship with mean unemployment
duration. The minimum wage and the presence of unions were both nega-
tively correlated with mean unemployment duration, but were not statisti-
cally significant when TFP and OCA were included in the analysis. The
p e rcentage of teenagers in total employment was negatively correlated with
mean unemployment duration, probably because if teenagers become
unemployed, they are likely to drop out of the labor force. Thus, many of
the factors often pointed to as causes of increasing unemployment duration
a re not as statistically significant as the rate of technological change.
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Table 4   Mean Duration of Unemployment and Percentage Distribution of
Total Employment by Gender, Age, and  Period
Simple Correlation 
with Mean  
1 9 5 0 – 1 9 6 0 – 1 9 7 0 – 1 9 8 0 – 1 9 9 0 – Duration of
1 9 5 9 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 5 Unemploymenta
Mean duration 11.4 11.7 11.5 14.6 15.6
of unemployment
(weeks)
Percentage distribution of total employment
Male
16–19 years 3.4 3.9 4.5 3.4 2.6 –0.51
20–24 years 5.4 6.2 7.4 6.9 5.5 0.07
25–54 years 46.4 42.7 38.6 37.8 39.2 –0.31
55 years and 
over 13.3 12.2 10.3 8.1 7.1 –0.52
Female 
16–19 years 2.6 3.0 3.7 3.1 2.4 0.26
20–24 years 3.8 4.4 6.1 6.1 5.0 0.19
25–54 years 20.3 21.4 23.3 28.9 32.7 0.56
55 years and 
over 4.8 6.1 6.0 5.6 5.4 0.01
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a The correlation coefficient is computed on the basis of 36 observatons (annual data
1950–1995).
S o u rc e : U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earn i n g s ( Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1977–1994); Handbook of Labor Statistics (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1985), Bulletin 2217, Table 15.
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a ffects older workers more adversely than younger workers in terms of
duration of unemployment. The correlation between TFP growth and
length of unemployment rose with the age group (from zero correlation
for the youngest to 0.22 for the oldest). The same is true of computeriza-
tion. The coefficient of OCA investment rose directly with age and is
actually negative for the youngest age group (indicating that it reduces
their duration of unemployment). Results are similar for females.
C o n t rolling for the overall unemployment rate proved essential. As
shown in Figure 1, the duration of unemployment is quite cyclical. It is
strongly correlated with the overall unemployment rate. The higher the
unemployment rate, the lower the probability of a jobless worker’s
obtaining a job; therefore, all else equal, the higher the overall rate, the
longer the spell of unemployment.
We repeated the statistical analysis with two additional dependent vari-
ables: (1) the percent of unemployed workers who are unemployed for 15
or more weeks and (2) the percent of unemployed workers who are
unemployed for 27 or more weeks. The results are similar to the previous
results. Technological change and computerization are correlated with
an increasing portion of workers unemployed for more than 15 or 27
weeks, implying that, taking other factors into account, an increase in
the pace of change significantly increases both the unemployment rate
and the average duration of unemployment.
These results are consistent with the argument that firms are re l u c t a n t
to invest in the training for older workers and unskilled workers associ-
ated with new technology. To identify the sources of the sharp incre a s e
in unemployment duration observed over the last 25 years or so, com-
p a re 1971 and 1994, two years at about the same stage of the business
cycle. Over this period mean unemployment duration increased by 66
p e rcent (from a low of 11.3 weeks at one point in 1971 to a high of
18.8 in 1994). By far the greatest effect, according to the statistical
analysis, was contributed by the increase in OCA investment per
employee over this period, from virtually zero to a high point of  $860
(in 1987 dollars).
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T h e re is a rich and well-documented body of materials in the literature of
sociology and social psychology that describe effects of unemployment not
widely mentioned in the economic discussions. They indicate that jobless-
ness has a variety of consequences, such as increased suicide, divorce, psy-
chosomatic illness, and criminal activity, whose social cost must surely be
added to the forgone output that results from unemployment. 
Though much of the literature makes little distinction between lengthy
and brief unemployment, it is reasonable to assume that a short spell of
unemployment causes little lasting psychological or social damage.
H o w e v e r, when the unemployment goes on and on and the worker
begins to fear that he or she will never hold a job again, various forms of
socially damaging behavior may emerge.
A quote from Mallinckrodt and Fretz (1988, 281) provides a summary of
the evidence:
The devastating impact of job loss on physical and mental
health has been summarized in several reviews of empirical
investigations (Dooley and Catalano 1980; Gordus, Jarley, and
Ferman 1981). Job loss has been linked to increased rates of sui-
cide (Hammermesh and Soss 1974; Pierce 1967), diagnosed
cases of mental illnesses and increases in both inpatient and
outpatient use of mental health services (Barling and Handal
1980; Brenner 1973; Frank 1981), increased alcohol abuse
(Pearlin and Radabaugh 1976; Smart 1979), more extern a l
locus of control (Parnes and King 1977), lowered self-esteem
( P e rfetti and Bingham 1983), and severe depression (Landau,
Neal, Meisner, and Prudic 1980). Some unemployed workers,
depending on their attributional style, respond to the uncon-
t rollable aversive event of job loss with learned helplessness
behaviors, namely, depression and a lowered self-concept, that
can immobilize job seeking eff o rts (Cohn 1978; Feather and
Davenport 1981).
The more ambiguous evidence on the relationship between unemploy-
ment and crime is discussed in Britt (1994).
Side Effects of Pro g re s s
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What can the government do to offset the side effects of technological
p ro g ress? How can it lighten the burden on the unemployed, make it
easier for them to find and hold jobs, and reduce the duration of unem-
ployment? 
Two changes in the unemployment insurance system could help the
unemployed during extended periods of joblessness. First, and foremost,
consideration should be given to increasing the 26-week cap on unem-
ployment benefits to 39 weeks or a year. The growth in unemployment
duration has caused the number of workers who are still unemployed
after their benefits have been exhausted to grow by two-thirds (as a pro-
p o rtion of the total unemployed population) from 1975 to 1995. The
exhaustion of benefits has been the major cause of the decline in the
percentage of unemployed workers who receive unemployment benefits,
which fell from a peak of 62.3 percent in 1975 to 35.7 percent in 1995.
The benefit period now is extended under extraordinary circumstances
(such as a deep recession) and only temporarily, but given the rising
duration of unemployment, it seems appropriate to write the extension
into legislation and make it permanent.
Second, there is good reason to increase the unemployment insurance
replacement rate. It has not budged over the last quarter century; the
rate in 1995, 36.5 percent, is the same as it was in 1970. In addition to
the trend of increased unemployment duration, there has been a tre n d
of declining real wages over this period, which has caused real unem-
ployment insurance benefit levels to fall. It is there f o re appropriate to
i n c rease the unemployment insurance benefit formula to provide higher
real benefit levels.
An objection might be raised that increasing both the length and level
of unemployment insurance benefits might cause people to choose to
remain on unemployment longer and therefore it would make the prob-
lem of unemployment duration worse rather than solving it. The argu-
ment goes that by reducing the cost to an individual of being jobless, the
extra amount of unemployment coverage will generally prolong the
duration of unemployment for many workers. The original architects of
How Technological Change Increases the Duration of Unemployment
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t e red that the added security individuals had while unemployed would
enable them to select a job more compatible with their skills and inter-
ests. We believe that this is the case and feel that the extra coverage
might give unemployed workers adversely affected by the introduction of
new technology added time for retraining and acquiring new skills.
M o re o v e r, it should be stressed that the secular rise of unemployment
duration over the last two decades cannot be attributed to rising unem-
ployment benefits or length of coverage, since these have not risen over
this period. 
To shorten the duration of unemployment, increased government partic-
ipation in retraining programs is needed. Acceleration of the obsoles-
cence of skills with the increased pace of technological change,
especially in the areas of computer and information technology, means
that many unemployed workers have been left without the re q u i s i t e
skills to find suitable employment. As we have seen, younger, poorly
educated workers and older workers are most likely to be unschooled in
the new technology. Government training efforts have a long history of
limited success, but part of the reason for this is that little of the retrain-
ing has been targeted to emerging technology. A targeted retraining pro-
gram promises to be more effective than one aimed at old and, in many
cases, obsolete skills.
Another more specific issue should be addressed: the problem of aiding
the workers who are most at risk—poorly educated young people and
older workers who are unable (or are suspected of being unable) to keep
up with the job demands of technological progress. We must confess that
we can give much less concrete policy recommendations on this issue.
The sad fact is that little is known about what works to improve the edu-
cational achievements of these groups. In this area, so crucial for the
general economic welfare, an extensive search of the literature turns up a
shocking lack of systematic evidence. It is, of course, to be expected that
academics will recommend further re s e a rch, but in the case of educa-
tional methods that are effective in improving the prospects of at-risk
workers, the recommendation is thoroughly justified, and appro p r i a t e
programs of research can and must be designed.
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fications of current teaching approaches, and the adoption of these mod-
ifications should be encouraged as an interim measure until more
systematic evidence and analysis become available. Incentives that help
reduce dropping out, rewards to students and teachers for improved stu-
dent performance, revision of curricula to make them more pertinent to
prospective employment, and curricula designed to develop flexibility in
students so that they will adapt more easily to changing job requirements
are some of the steps that have been recommended by thoughtful educa-
tors. The fact that the less-educated, younger workers are so seriously
affected by technological change leads to the conclusion that improving
education is the approach that is most likely to have substantial and last-
ing results. Research is needed, but there are enough ideas and sufficient
experience in the area to make a reasonable start. Indeed, a program of
systematic research carefully coordinated with such initiatives may pro-
vide the best opportunity for expansion of knowledge on the subject.
The prescription for older workers is similar. Adult education can pre-
pare them to adapt to technological change and help mitigate the fear of
departing from long-followed work programs and practices. There is evi-
dence that older persons can be helped to acquire the flexibility required
for adaptation to change and that inflexibility on their part is as much a
response to social prejudices as to the physiological and psychological
e ffects of aging. Also, since older workers’ job problems are related to
employers’ preconceptions, perhaps, in addition to education, incentives
for the provision of jobs to older workers should be considered.
If greater retraining eff o rts are coupled with longer unemployment insur-
ance coverage and higher benefits, unemployed persons will have both the
means and the opportunity to acquire the new skills. The combined eff e c t
may be not just to aid workers who suffer joblessness because of technolog-
ical change but to offset rising unemployment duration in this country.
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1. If the skilled worker was more than three times as productive as the unskilled
worker, the employer would hire more skilled and fewer unskilled workers. If
the skilled worker was less than three times as productive as an unskilled
worker, the employer would hire more unskilled and fewer skilled workers.
2. Of course, the substitution will be far from complete; skilled workers will not
take over the jobs of ditchdiggers and dishwashers. But there are jobs where
the difference between slightly less skilled and slightly more skilled workers is
marginal, and there we can expect a change in relative wages to make a sub-
stantial difference. The example obviously also assumes some stickiness in rel-
ative wages. Otherwise, the wages of the unskilled workers might fall
sufficiently to offset the decline in the demand for them, although the usual
supply-demand model leads us to expect that a wage fall will moderate the rise
in unemployment of the unskilled but not offset it altogether.
3. All of this will, incidentally, add to the financial return to investment in edu-
cation, as has been happening in recent years. In addition, it will exacerbate
inequality in income distribution, raising the earnings of younger and more-
educated workers at the expense of older and less-educated workers.
4. Our own judgment is that the rapid growth of total factor productivity (TFP)
in the 1950s and 1960s is ascribable to a considerable degree to the rapid pro-
ductivity growth made possible by recovery of economies ruined by depression
and war. Such economies, working with skills, knowledge, and experience
already available, can achieve a spectacular rate of growth of productivity with
little technical change. Pre d i c t a b l y, such a process will end once the ru i n e d
economies have been resuscitated, and the rate of growth after that point is
bound to slow materially. In addition, there tends to be a lag in reaping the
benefits of at least some major innovations, as some observers believe is true of
the contribution of computers to TFP growth. Thus, one can conclude that
the slowdown in TFP growth need not imply a slowdown in the rate of tech-
nological change.
5. Here we report briefly on our findings. For details of the study and results, see
Baumol and Wolff (1998).
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